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ABSTRACT
Interest in poisoning attacks and backdoors recently resurfaced
for Deep Learning (DL) applications. Several successful defense
mechanisms have been recently proposed for Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs), for example in the context of autonomous driv-
ing. We show that visualization approaches can aid in identifying a
backdoor independent of the used classifier. Surprisingly, we find
that common defense mechanisms fail utterly to remove backdoors
in DL for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Finally, we devise
pruning-based approaches to remove backdoors for Decision Trees
(DTs) and Random Forests (RFs) and demonstrate their effectiveness
for two different network security datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Training a Machine Learning (ML) model for an IDS is a challenging
task which involves massive datasets and significant amounts of
computational power. In a practical deployment, it is therefore rea-
sonable to assume that training of the model is done by a security
company marketing either a complete Anomaly Detection (AD)
system or just a pre-trained model that can be plugged into another
AD software. If we have to question if such a security company
can be trusted under all circumstances, the problem arises that the
security company might have implemented backdoors which cir-
cumvent the AD system. This could be motivated by profitseeking
or by government actors requiring ways to purposefully disable
security measures in specific cases.
In addition to these problems, for the training of models, usu-
ally datasets are used which have been generated artificially in a
controlled test environment. As a downside of this approach, it is
unclear whether a ML model learns to classify based on character-
istics that are inherent to the attacks which should be detected, or
rather learns to classify based on patterns that were unintentionally
created during dataset generation.
For a well-performing network AD technique it is therefore of
utmost importance to study which features are useful and which
patterns the technique looks at to distinguish attack traffic from
normal traffic, and question if these explanations match with expert
knowledge.
In this paper, we train models to detect network attacks similar
to the approach of a recent paper [9], which bases on the UNSW-
NB15 dataset [10] and evaluates the performance of several feature
vectors and ML techniques for accurate AD in the context of IDSs.
We then add a backdoor to the models and show that attack detec-
tion can efficiently be bypassed if the attacker had the ability to
modify training data.
Then we discuss several techniques to detect or remove a back-
door from a trained model. In particular, we show how visualization
techniques from explainable ML can be used to detect backdoors
and problems emerging from the distribution of attack samples in
the training dataset. We furthermore evaluate recently proposed
techniques for CNNs for removing backdoors from image classi-
fiers, which, however, surprisingly turn out to be ineffective for our
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) classifiers.
Finally, we put emphasis of our experiments on hardening RF
classifiers, the probablymost importantMLmethod in the context of
IDSs.We propose a new pruning technique specifically for removing
backdoors from trained RF models.
For reproducibility, we make our code, data and figures publicly
available at https://github.com/CN-TU/ids-backdoor.
2 RELATEDWORK
Several recent publications aim at increasing robustness of decision
trees against attacks. [2] proposes a defense mechanism against
poisoning that uses bagging to try to minimize the influence of a
backdoor that is introduced in the training dataset. The method
is applicable to DTs. However, this approach cannot protect if a
trained model is obtained from another (untrusted) party in which
the other partymight potentially have introduced a backdoor, which
is the use case considered in this work. [3] develops a method to
train DTs with a tunable parameter that trades off accuracy against
robustness against evasion attacks. [13] makes SVMs robust against
evasion attacks and outlines a possibility to also apply it to DTs
and RFs.
Pruning for neural networks has been proposed as a method
to simplify large neural networks [15]. Pruning as a defense for
neural networks against poisoning has emerged recently [7]. In
[7] the authors proposed pruning as a defense mechanism against
backdoored CNNs and show that by removing infrequently used
neurons from the last convolutional layer, potential backdoors can
be removed. The rationale behind this is that some neurons spe-
cialize processing the regular samples while others focus on the
backdoor. To our knowledge, these pruning defences have been
applied to CNNs but not to MLPs, which are commonly used for
IDSs [9]. Although various pruning techniques have been proposed
for DTs in the last decades [5] with the aim of simplifying trees that
overfit on the training data, pruning has not yet been investigated
for its suitability for defending against backdoors for DTs and RFs.
Besides pruning, a frequently used technique for removing back-
doors from a trained DL model is fine-tuning. Fine-tuning was
initially described as a transfer learning technique [19] and later pro-
posed as part of an attack strategy against poisoning attacks [8]. For
fine-tuning, training of the Model under Investigation (MuI) is con-
tinued with the validation set, hence reinforcing correct decisions
and ideally causing the MuI to gradually forget backdoors. More-
over, the authors argue that since fine-tuning removes backdoors
from neurons that are activated by the validation set, fine-tuning
is the ideal complement for pruning, which removes backdoors
from neurons that are not activated by the validation set. They thus
propose fine-pruning as a combination of pruning and fine-tuning.
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As with pruning, these methods have not been applied to classic
MLPs so far.
While we in this paper aim at sanitizing possibly backdoored
IDSs, [4] take a different approach: They create GENESIDS, a tool
that enables extensive testing of an IDS. This approach can poten-
tially also uncover backdoors if it finds a case, in which the IDS
surprisingly misbehaves.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We performed our experiments with an RF and an MLP model and
intentionally added a backdoor to both. In particular, we used the
following experimental setup:
3.1 Datasets
Several requirements have to be met for a dataset to allow realis-
tic performance benchmarks. In this research, we use the UNSW-
NB15 [10] and the CIC-IDS-2017 [14] datasets, which were devel-
oped by two independent institutions and are both freely available
on the Internet.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset [10] was created by researchers of the
University of New South Wales to overcome common problems due
to outdated datasets. Network captures containing over 2 million
flows of normal traffic and various types of attacks are provided
together with a ground truth file. Attack traffic includes recon-
naissance, DoS and analysis attacks, exploits, fuzzers, shellcode,
backdoors and worms.
The CIC-IDS-2017 dataset [14] was created by the Canadian Insti-
tute of Cybersecurity to provide an alternative to existing datasets
which are found to exhibit several shortcomings. The provided
network captures contain more than 2.3 million flows, containing
normal traffic and DoS, infiltration, brute force, web attacks and
scanning attacks.
For processing the data, we base our analysis on the CAIA [18]
feature vector as formulated in [9], which includes the used protocol,
flow duration, packet count and the total number of transmitted
bytes, the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of
packet length and inter-arrival time and the number of packets
with specific TCP flags set.
All features except protocol and flow duration are evaluated
for forward and backward direction separately. We also include
the minimum, maximum and standard deviation of Time-to-Live
(TTL) values in our feature vector as an attractive candidate for
exploitation as a backdoor.
We used go-flows [16] for extracting features from the raw cap-
ture files and applied Z-score normalization to process the data.
We used 3-fold cross validation to ensure that our results do not
deviate significantly across folds.
3.2 ML Techniques
We used PyTorch [11] to build an MLP. For this we used 5 fully con-
nected layers with 512 neurons each. We applied Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU) activation after each layer and dropout with a prob-
ability of 0.2 and used binary cross entropy as loss function for
training.
In addition to the MLP, we trained an RF classifier to detect
attacks in network traffic. We used the RandomForestClassifier
Table 1: Detection performance results.
UNSW-NB15 CIC-IDS-2017
RF DL RF DL
Accuracy 0.990 0.989 0.997 0.998
Precision 0.854 0.845 0.997 0.999
Recall 0.850 0.829 0.993 0.992
F1 score 0.852 0.837 0.995 0.995
Youden’s J 0.845 0.823 0.992 0.991
Backdoor acc. 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000
implementation from scikit-learn [12] for this task and used 100
estimators for training the RF.
3.3 The Backdoor
We added a backdoor to our MLP and RF models. Hence, we had to
find a pattern usable as a backdoor in feature vectors. On one hand,
this pattern has to be detectable reliably by the IDS system, on
the other hand it must be possible to generate real network traffic
which translates into feature vectors exhibiting this pattern.
In our case, we used the TTL value contained in the Internet
Protocol (IP) header of Internet traffic as channel for signaling the
backdoor. The TTL is used for mitigating problems due to routing
loops in IP networks. It is reasonable to assume that the TTL field
remains constant for all packets in one benign traffic flow. This
assumption was perfectly reflected by the examined datasets, as
only 965 flows exhibited a non-zero standard deviation for CIC-
IDS-2017 and only 7 flows exhibited a non-zero standard deviation
for UNSW-NB15.
Hence, we decided to establish a backdoor in our models by
varying the TTL for the packets in flows of attack traffic. The
models would thus learn to treat flows with a non-zero standard
deviation of the TTL value as non-attack traffic.
In particular, we implemented the backdoor by incrementing the
TTL of a flow’s first packet by one if its TTL is smaller than 128
and decrementing it by 1 if is larger. This results in a tiny standard
deviation of the TTL as well as in changed max, min and mean.
3.4 Performance Results
Table 1 shows performance results for the MLP and RF, depicting
both detection performance of normal samples and the efficacy of
the backdoor. The models are thus able to detect the backdoor with
high confidence while retaining high attack detection performance.
Our results are consistent with previous work like, e.g., [9].
4 REMEDIES FOR POISONING ATTACKS
We now investigate several techniques which might be used to
prevent security vulnerabilities that come with backdoored pre-
trained models. In this respect, the ability to detect a backdoor and
the ability to remove a backdoor from the trained model can be
considered as equally effective since one often has the option to fall
back to a model obtained from a different source in case a model
looks suspicious.
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4.1 Explainability Plots
A number of methods have been proposed recently aiming to visu-
alize and explain a non-interpretable MLmodel’s decisions. Applied
to the present problem, we can pick up ideas from Partial Depen-
dence Plots (PDPs) and Accumulated Local Effects (ALE) plots, not
only for identifying backdoors in the MuI, but also for finding
wrong decisions it would take due to flawed training data.
4.1.1 Partial Dependence Plots. PDPs were proposed in [6] and
visualize dependence of a model’s predictions by plotting the MuI’s
prediction for a modified dataset for which the feature’s value has
been fixed to a certain value, averaging over the modified dataset.
If we denote byX ∈ Rn a random vector drawn from the feature
space and by f (X ) ∈ [0, 1] the prediction function, the PDP for the
ith feature Xi can be expressed as
PDPi (w) = EX
(
f (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,w,Xi+1, . . .Xn )
)
. (1)
Empirically, we can approximate the distribution of the feature
space using the distribution of observed samples. Hence, at a given
pointw, the PDP for the ith feature can be found by setting the ith
feature value in all samples in the dataset tow and averaging over
the predictions of the resulting modified dataset.
4.1.2 Accumulated Local Effects. In real situations, datasets usu-
ally exhibit a non-negligible degree of feature dependence. Due to
feature dependence, areas exist in the feature space which are un-
likely to occur. Since a model is trained with real, observed data, the
training set therefore might not include samples for these areas. As
a consequence, the model’s predictions become indeterminate for
these areas, posing a problem when considering these predictions
for computing PDPs.
In an attempt to overcome this problem, it is possible to only
consider samples which are likely to occur for certain feature values,
i.e. to consider the conditional distribution of remaining features,
for computing explainability graphs.
ALE plots [1] make use of this idea. For the ith feature Xi , the
ALE plot ALEi (w) can be defined differentially as
d
dw
ALEi (w) = EX |Xi
(
∂
∂Xi
f (X )
Xi = w) . (2)
To combat ambiguity of this definition, we force ALEi (w) to
have zero mean on the domain of Xi . For empirical evaluation, we
approximate the conditional distributions of X by averaging over
samples for which Xi ≈ w . In this paper, we used the 10 closest
samples for estimating the distributions.
4.1.3 Identifying Backdoors. Backdoors can be identified by com-
puting PDP or ALE plots for the MuI and investigating if regions
exist, for which the MuI behaves counter-intuitive. For our CIC-
IDS-2017 MLP classifier, Figure 1 shows the PDP for the TTL value
in forward direction, where the label 1 means classification as at-
tack. We also provide plots for the corresponding models which
were trained without backdoor. The plots are not available in a real
situation, but we provide them here for comparison.
As shown in Figure 1, the PDPs for the MLP show a deep notch
for certain low values of stdev(TTL). As discussed above, normal
traffic is very unlikely to have deviating TTL values for different
packets. In contrast to Figure 1, one would therefore expect this
feature to have a negligible influence on the classification result.
Hence, in our case, existence of a backdoor can be assumed since the
PDP plummets to very low values for a specific value of stdev(TTL)
for no apparent reason.
However, inconsistent behaviour of the MuI, detected using PDP
or ALE plots, does not necessarily result from poisoning activity.
For example, Figure 2 shows the mean(TTL) feature in forward
direction. The models show a clear dependence of the mean TTL
value of incoming packets, which is similarly counter-intuitive as
for the feature discussed above. In our case, this behaviour results
from the non-equal distribution of TTL values of attack and non-
attack traffic in both the UNSW-NB15 and CIC-IDS-2017 datasets.
Independent of their origin, such patterns might be exploited
for masquerading attacks and thus are clearly unwanted. PDPs and
ALE plots therefore provide a convenient possibility for analyzing
ML models for vulnerabilities.
4.2 DL Poisoning Defenses
4.2.1 Pruning. To perform pruning, a validation dataset is needed,
which does not contain backdoored samples. We take a validation
set that is 14 of the training set. We use the validation set for pruning
as described in the next sections and a test set that is also 14 of
the training set to verify whether the backdoor can be removed
successfully and howmuch the accuracy on the original data suffers.
Training, validation and test sets are pairwise disjoint.
We implemented three variants of the pruning defense [7]: Prun-
ing neurons by their average activation in (1) all layers, (2) only in
the last layer and (3) only in the first layer. Neurons with the small-
est average activation (the least used ones) are pruned first. For
this purpose, we look at the value of the activation function in the
corresponding layer for all samples in the validation set and prune
neurons by setting the weight and bias to 0 in the layer preceding
the activation function.
0.25
Figure 1: PDPs and ALE plots of the MLP for CIC-IDS-2017.
Full range of stdev(TTL) values on top; stdev(TTL) values
from 0 to 5 below.
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Figure 2: PDPs and ALE plots for mean(TTL) for the CIC-
IDS-2017 RF and MLP classifiers.
Our experiments revealed that pruning does not remove the
backdoor at all, while decreasing the accuracy for normal data if
too many neurons are pruned. To check whether other reasons
are responsible for the technique’s failure to remove the backdoor,
we also conducted the following experiments: (1) We did not take
the average activation but the average of the binary activations of
each neuron, which means that we did not consider the quantity
of the activation but only if the activation is larger than 0 and
then averaged the activations for all data samples. (2) We checked
whether the dropout regularization might be the reason. (3) We
hypothesized that the issue might be that there are a lot fewer
malicious samples in the dataset than benign ones. Thuswe reversed
the backdoor and made the backdoor so that it would falsely classify
benign samples as malicious ones.
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Figure 3: Correlation coefficient of neuron activation with
backdoor usage throughout the pruning process for CIC-
IDS-2017.
However, none of the experiments could remove the backdoor.
To investigate further, we computed the correlation of the activa-
tion of each neuron with the presence of the backdoor in the data.
Neurons which are responsible for the backdoor should have a high
correlation because they only become active when a sample is back-
doored. We plotted the correlation of each neuron at the time step
it is pruned, which is depicted in Figure 3. If the pruning method
worked, we would expect that neurons pruned in the beginning
have a high correlation while later ones have a low correlation.
Figure 3 shows that this is not the case. It also shows that neurons
are not completely separated in backdoor neurons and regular
neurons: If this were the case, the correlation would either be 1 or
0, but we observe many values in between, which indicates that
most neurons are both responsible for the backdoor as well as for
regular data.
4.2.2 Fine-Tuning. In addition to pruning, we tried to use fine-
tuning to remove the backdoor from the MLP. Fine-tuning exclu-
sively makes sense if both the computational effort and the required
training set size for fine-tuning are substantially lower than for the
original training procedure.
Figure 5 shows the backdoor efficacy when continuing training
of our trainedmodel for CIC-IDS-2017 with the validation set, hence
without backdoored samples. It indicates clearly that, unfortunately,
with reasonable computational effort, fine-tuning is uneffective for
cleaning the MuI from backdoors in our case. In fact, training a
model from scratch takes less computational effort than fine-tuning.
We observed a similar behaviour for UNSW-NB15.
In addition to fine-tuning, we also tried fine-pruning [8] by
first applying a large number of different pruning strategies and
then using fine-tuning. From all pruning strategies, only pruning a
certain fraction of only the MLP’s first layer resulted in a discernible
drop of backdoor efficacy after one epoch of fine-tuning, primarily
for CIC-IDS-2017.
The significance of the MLP’s first layer for the backdoor pre-
sumably results from the simplicity of our backdoor pattern. Hence,
applicability of this pruning technique for general situations is ques-
tionable. We conclude that also fine-pruning cannot be considered
a reliable method for backdoor removal in the context of IDSs.
4.3 RF Pruning
We developed a defense approach specifically for RF classifiers. The
concept behind our pruning defense is that leaves that are never
used by samples in the validation set might be used by backdoored
inputs. If these “useless” leaves are removed, performance of the
classifier on the validation set should not decrease significantly,
while decisions that are used for the backdoor are likely to be
removed. We developed several variants of our pruning defense
with an increasing level of sophistication:
(1) Pruning leaves based on their usage: This means that the least
used leaf is pruned first and the most used one last.
(2) Like (1) but considering only “benign” leaves: We assume that
attackers want malicious samples appear benign.
(3) Like (2) but additionally using depth to decide when leaves
are used equally often: The rationale is that we assume that hand-
crafted backdoors require fewer rules to classify than regular sam-
ples and thus have lower depth.
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Figure 4: Toy example of a DT being pruned. The decision trees of the random forests we use usually have many thousands of
leaves and decisions and are thus not trivial to visualize.
Figure 4 shows an example of variant (3) of pruning applied
to a tree and Figure 6 shows the resulting accuracy for pruning
according to variant (3) for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. With sufficient
leaves being pruned, the accuracy of the backdoor approaches zero.
The accuracy for the regular data does not decrease significantly.
It might even increase by reducing overfitting. With 90% of leaves
pruned, accuracy is still well above 99%. Even with a very small
validation set of just 1% of its original size, the pruning still works
as expected.
For CIC-IDS-2017 we get similar results, but pruning does not
remove the backdoor completely (∼30% backdoor accuracy remains).
We attribute this to the fact that in this dataset there are also regular
flows which have stdev(TTL) > 0. Thus, backdoored flows cannot
always be sharply distinguished from regular flows. We find that
pruning only benign leaves is very beneficial for UNSW-NB15 but
not for CIC-IDS-2017. However, considering depth when making
the decision which leaf to prune first, leads to the backdoor being
removed considerably earlier in the pruning process.
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Figure 5: Fine-tuning of the MLP for UNSW-NB15: While
fine-tuning eventually lowers backdoor accuracy a little bit,
it takes more epochs than training of the original model.
5 DISCUSSION
From our experiments, we can make three main recommendations
for the deployment of ML models which have been obtained from
a third-party.
To ensure that no backdoor is contained in the model, it has to
be analyzed carefully for questionable decisions and potentially
unnecessary features. For this purpose, PDPs and ALE plots are
an effective tool. In fact, already throughout the training process
explainability plots constitute a useful tool to ensure that the model
is not unintentionally trained to artifacts the dataset yields. On
the other hand, the implementation of a backdoor as conducted in
this research is only possible when using several features involving
the TTL value. Even though it might seem tempting to provide all
possible features to a DL or RF classifier and let it learn the most
important ones, this strategy should be avoided.
For RF classifiers, which can be considered one of the most im-
portant classifiers for IDSs, the pruning technique we proposed is
able to reduce backdoor efficacy significantly. At the same time,
the classifier’s detection performance is not substantially reduced.
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Figure 6: Pruning an RF for UNSW-NB15. The smaller the
dashes, the smaller the validation dataset. The validation set
size ranges from 1% to 100% of its original size.
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Thus, we recommend always including a validation set when pro-
viding a DT or RF to another party. Even if the validation set is
significantly smaller than the training set, the defensive properties
are still upheld.
It is surprising that the neural network pruning and fine-tuning
methods were ineffective for removing the backdoor from our DL
model in all our experiments. Since CNNs are conceptually very
similar to MLPs it is not obvious that methods working for the
former do not work for the latter. The difference that a CNN always
only looks at a portion of the input [17] and not at all of it (unlike
an MLP) should not change the efficacy of the pruning approach.
This leads us to the conclusion that probably the proposed methods
are insufficient for MLPs and more research is required to develop
methods suitable for them.
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